LONDON, England, — In an interview with Rojhelat, Hemn Seyedi a Kurdish political analyst stated that none of the Kurdish political parties from the left to the right have excluded the independence option. “Advocating federalism or confederalism stems from political pragmatism,” he said.
Evaluating of what is termed as “Arab Spring” or the “Peoples Spring”, Seyedi remarked; “We could say that long before the experiences of Tunes and Egypt, the sequence of events had set off in Kurdistan; each part [of Kurdistan] with its own unique character,” and he continued to articulate the Kurdish experiences in North and South Kurdistan.
Asked about the recent agreement reached by Iranian Kurdistan Democrat Party and Iranian Kurdistan Revolutionary Toilers Party (Komele), Seyedi observed; “I have my own criticism of this agreement. I believe this agreement was reached for preventing further agreements. They united in order not to unite with other circles.”
Mr. Seyedi believes there was nothing new in the agreement and the over-reactions displayed by the Iranian oppositions was “manufactured… artificial… erroneous… they [the Iranian oppositions] intended to stimulate a clamorous climate with the purpose of forcing the Kurds into positions of retreat, reaction, or pleading and brining the old discourse of ‘we are more Iranian than anyone’ back, but they did not succeed,” evaluated Mr. Seyedi.
He also argued that one of the good sides of this agreement was that it displayed the gap in the words and the deeds of certain sections of the Iranian oppositions. The agreement was a good test for them, said Mr. Seyedi, “unfortunately, they did not pass the test in this respect”, he added.
The Kurdish political analyst also criticised the “international laws” as being of “inter-states laws” according to which tyrants such as Bashar Assad is the legitimate ruler of Syrian people. “Within the context of the international laws”, contended Seyedi, “until Hosni Mubarak had not withdrawn, he was the legal, lawful and ‘legitimate’ president of Egypt. Had he not left the power, the protesters of Tahrir Square would have eternally been labelled as vagabonds and trouble-makers.”
At the end of the interview Mr Seyedi argued that even from these inadequate “international laws” he can unearth clauses; “according to which the principle of self-determination is a right the Kurdish people can rely on, as it is a subdivision of the human rights convention”.
The full interview comes as follow:
Rojhelat: Dear Hemn Seyedi, how would you evaluate the current phenomena known as the “Arab Spring” or the “Nations Spring”?
Seyedi: What has happened in the last couple of years in the region, I would divide into two different phases. The first phase was what we witnessed in Tunes, Egypt and to some extent the beginning of Syrian experience. In the sequence of events in Tunis and Egypt we saw the masses of the people. It was the people who had to make the decisions about their destiny, for example, it was the people who ruled that the Tunisian president should either stay or concede some of his power or not to stay at all. In Egypt they tried all they could to preserve some powers in the hand of Hosni Mubarak, but the people persisted on their demands until they reached their goals.
But the same experience was not followed in Libya. The external powers interfered and turned the country into a rivalry field; the United States and the Western powers casted attention to the Libyan natural and oil reserves and etc. In Syrian, the internal rivalry was added to the external challenges. Turkey, the Golf countries in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the one hand; Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah and some fundamental groups on the other, come to the equations.
As you see in the second phase, the contenting phenomena called as the “Peoples’ Spring” was derailed. But I hope that in the near future the sequences of events would take on its first original phase, knowing as the “Peoples Spring”.
Rojhelat: Let’s shift our attention to Kurdistan. Do you think that the Kurdish people have prepared themselves to take advantage of the current phase?
Seyedi: We could say that long before the experiences of Tunes and Egypt, the sequence of events had set off in Kurdistan; each part [of Kurdistan] with its own unique character. We saw that from 2008 onward a new phase of struggle began in North Kurdistan, which was not only tied with the Mountains, but it engaged the streets and the parliament also. A three-dimensional struggle was going on in the Mountains, the streets and the parliament.
In South Kurdistan; long before the “Peoples’ Spring” the masses of people came to the streets orchestrating non-violent demonstrations against corruption, political intransigence and economical ambiguousness. If you remember the Goran [change] Movement in South Kurdistan emerged long before the Tunes and Egypt uprisings.
That is why, I believe, Kurdistan not only has demonstrated its readiness for such waves, but it can also stand up for the current phase and I believe at the end of road we see that what has been known as “Arab Spring” would become a “Kurdish Spring”. Hence we would be adding three-four different experiences of [our] people’s rule to the history of the international movements.
Rojhelat: You mentioned a good point. Some peoples mainly Kurdish commentators have criticised the phrase “Arab Spring”, saying it is the “Peoples’ Spring” which followed after the “Kurdish Spring” dating back to 1990s. But after a couple of decades why the “Kurdish Spring” has not achieved what their Arab counterparts have attained?
Seyedi: In different phases of each nation’s struggle, this is not only the internal factors who decide. The international joint problems, external interference and other exterior dynamics could impact the internal issues. Let me point to the “Iranian Spring”, a spring that unleashed one year before the “Arab Spring” but did not succeed. You referred to the disappointment of the Kurdish movements. But I point to a century-long libertarian movement in Iran. It has experienced success in many occasions, having the Constitutional Revolution in its history for example, it managed to establish a parliament, and it became the first revolution in the Middle East but ended up in despotism and tyranny. Subsequently, the Oil Nationalisation Movement emerged which again disrupted and diluted by the intervention of external powers which ultimately led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
So, this is not only the problem of the Kurdish movement which has not succeeded so far. They could say that we can take advantage of our failures as well as the failures experienced by other peoples and turn them into a recipe for our forthcoming successes.
Rojhelat: As you know, Iranian Kurdistan Democrat Party and Iranian Kurdistan Revolutionary Toilers Party (Komale) reached an agreement with the view of working together. Although they stressed on their “Iranian” being in their agreement endeavouring to unite the Iranian oppositions, not the Kurds, but the Iranian oppositions have fulminated at such an agreement, accusing them as “separatists”; what the intention behind the Iranian oppositions’ attacks on this agreement? Are such attacks on the agreement in itself? Where such attacks come from?
Seyedi: Let’s make it explicit, though not now, for another time may be, that I have my own criticism of this agreement. I believe this agreement was reached for preventing further agreements. They united in order not to unite with other circles. Let’s not immerse in this matter now.
The reaction displayed by the Iranian circles, I should say, could be regarded as “manufactured… artificial… erroneous”. There was nothing new in this agreement. The issue of representing the Kurds as nation, pointing to the subjects of self-determination or federalism have the history of at least 10 to 12 years in the agenda of these two political parties. These political circles [the Iranian opposition] are not the people ignorant of the strategies and programmes of these parties [the two Kurdish parties]. What they intended to do was to stimulate a clamorous climate with the purpose of forcing the Kurds into positions of retreat, reaction, or pleading and brining the old discourse of “we can more Iranian than anyone” back, but they did not succeed.
This was because although their over-reaction was illogical, it also caused reaction by some individuals among the Fars society itself, the individuals who still possess animated conscious and feel responsible—although they love their homeland but possess their own independent views and political analysis. They took position against this chauvinist approach. The best example was Shadi Sadir, the one who not only stood against this chauvinist over-reaction, but she also explicitly argued that we cannot talk about democracy if we were to exclude the rights of people to self-determination and definition of nation is a self-defined concept and depends on how the people want to define themselves. So we cannot set definition for them denying they are not nation but an ethnic group.
Generally, they [the oppositions] came to the fore with a plan and a purpose, wanting to take the initiative and force the Kurds one stage backward but they ultimately backfired in their project.
Rojhelat: The Iranian opposition on general accuse the Kurds of being “separatists”, though most of Kurdish political parties in East Kurdistan have defined their projects within the Iranian current borders; advocating either con-federal, federal or regional autonomy. There are very few groups advocating independence. Nonetheless, the Iranian oppositions have accused Kurds as “separatists”, is it actually the case or just a pretext for the future suppression of the Kurds?
Seyedi: Let me tell you that after the harsh position taken by the chauvinist circles, for the first time in the history a number of intellectuals and political activists in this part of Kurdistan released a declaration published it in Kurdish and Farsi languages. They announced that we want to secede for we believe that no longer we can live within the current Iranian framework, along with the people who possess this kind of mindset, we don’t want to continue coexistence as we want our own political destiny.
Yes, none of the Kurdish political parties from the right to the left, from those who have a long history of resistance to PJAK (Kurdistan’s Free Life Party) which has recently emerged, have demanded independence. Nonetheless, it should be said that none of these parties have rejected the option of independence either. I could say that by stressing on the point that the Kurds are a nation and their country has been divided—a point on which at least Kurdistan Democrat Party and PJAK are unwavering and have declared that they believe the Kurds are a nation divided between few states and when we are advocating federalism or confederalism it stems from political pragmatism not because we believe that other part of Kurdistan differ from ours, sheds light on this fact.
Having considered this, I would assume, it might direct them toward an inference that their proposal for solution of the Kurdish issue is a two-option proposition. On the one hand, if there are chances or opportunities devoid of any discrimination and segregation for us to live within the current Iranian borders, they would say, we prefer —our first option— to stay in the existing borders. Contrariwise, none of these [Kurdish parties] have completely excluded the option of independence. Although their political inspiration and demands are not that [independence], they have not discarded it either.
Rojhelat: The Iranian oppositions spanning the left and right would consider themselves as democrat and defenders of human rights. As we all know the alphabet of democracy is “the people’ rule, by the people and for the people”; having said that, would the Iranian democrat oppositions be ready to let the Kurds to decide for themselves, whether they want to remain with Iran, or to have an either federal/confederal authority or secede from Iran?
Seyedi: One of the good points that this agreement elicited was that it made explicit the long gap between democracy-seeking slogans of a section of the Iranian oppositions, and their mindset, practically, in reference to democracy. Unfortunately, they did not pass the test in this respect.
It was proved that only at the level of words, they are democrat. Or, if they are democrat, or if they are not ill-intended, we could say that they have no insightful knowledge of the concepts of democracy. They either lie, or lack knowledge of it. We see, for example, that some of them still believe that if a decision has to be made in relation to self-determination of Kurds in Kurdistan, the people of Shiraz, Isfahan, and Kerman should also take part in the process of this decision. So, they have not yet understood a simple issue such as this. A section of them has not understood this issue, and another section has evaded it for having a crooked perception of democracy.
The strange issue is that sometimes they resort to texts, documents and declaration of pretentiously international arena such as the concept of “international laws”, or issue like that no one should take part in disintegration of other countries. The issues that we could say that some states have convened and drafted cluster of laws of “inter-state” character, have never been the “international laws”.
These “international laws”, however, are still subject to interpretation and explanation. Even from the existing far unhealthy “international laws”, I can elicit out the right of self-determination and dig up the right of Kurds to independence.
They [the Iranian oppositions] have searched among these laws selectively, based on their own advantages, excluding certain detrimental points to their interests, bringing to the fore the points serving their own interests, reaching their conclusion that according to the “international laws”, no country has the right to decide in disintegration of another country, and the current political systems and geographical borders should everlastingly perpetuate.
Hereby, I should say that the Kurdish question is not a legal issue that could be solved by resorting to legal way, by compiling a complaint taking it to a court and pealing for solution.
The Kurdish question is a political issue at the first stage, not a legal one. Secondly, what that has been recognised as “international laws” that some gentlemen have relied on, have proved so scandalous that according to which the Bashar Assad now is the legal and lawful leader of Syria. What we observe now is that within the context of “international laws” the Syrian delegate now is representing Bashar Assad in the United Nations’ General Assembly.
Within the context of the “international laws” [which these gentlemen rely on], until Hosni Mubarak had not withdrawn, he was the legal, lawful and “legitimate” president of Egypt. Had he not left the power, the protesters of Tahrir Square would have eternally been labelled as vagabonds and trouble-makers.
Therefore, in the last few decades, the struggles of peoples and their political decisions have managed to impose retreat on these inter-state laws that have illegitimately been titled as “international laws”.
Ultimately, I would say that from the laws they [the Iranian oppositions] have evoked to deny other nations the right of self-determination discarding it as in violation of “international laws”, I can dig out segments according to which the principle of self-determination is a right the Kurdish people can rely on, as it is a subdivision of the human rights convention.
Rojhelat: Do you think that the aggressive reactions of Iranian oppositions and their intellectuals, who mainly reside in Europe and the United States to the agreement of these two parties, would push the Kurdish groups toward each other?
Seyedi: I assume it would fortify the sequence of Kurdish [societal] movement instead of Kurdish groups. The Kurdish groups should first overcome their internal problems. To the contrary, sometimes one must be anxious by the possibility that the Kurdish groups might give advantage to the non-Kurdish groups to out-manoeuvre one other. But it made the Kurdish movement, the Kurdish intellectual movement more unified.
In my opinion it would affect the Kurdish individuals, the Kurdish intellectual and the Kurdish thinkers. Its positive consequences might also reach the Kurdish groups.
Rojhelat: Thank you very much, dear Hemin Seyedi a political analyst for this interview.
Seyedi: Thank you too.