The first phase of PKK’s evolution
PKK was established by Abdullah Ocalan, known by his nickname “Apo”, in 1973 in Ankara University. Ocalan was a political science student and had been active in Dev Genc during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At this period his group was known as the “Apoci”, meaning the followers of the “Apo”. The emergence of the PKK marked a new phase of Kurdish nationalist movement in the Middle East. Unlike all the previous groups in Turkey or elsewhere, the “Apoci Group” exclusively consisted of Turkey’s growing proletariat. They were filled with anger at the exploitation of rural and urban proletariat at the hands of ruling class. The groups aims were to recreate the Kurdish identity they felt they had lost through the state attempts to homogenise the society. They advocated an independent Kurdish socialist state for the entire Kurdish population in the Middle East, but later they modified their objectives. One of the reasons for the PKK’s success which stands in marked contrast with any other Kurdish or Middle Eastern group is that they are highly disciplined and well motivated. As McDowell pus it; “The Apocis were, above all, an exclusivist group of true believers.” (McDowell 1996: 419)
It should be noted that prior to the 1980 military coup, which brought with itself the period of sever repression and martial laws throughout the country, the large majority of political violence in Turkey was conducted by the Turkish left, Islamists, and right-wing groups in the cities and not the Kurdish nationalists. The aftermath of 1980 coup marked the eradication of the vast majority of the insurgent and opposition groups. Their members were killed, arrested or forced out of the country. As McDowell puts it no fewer than 81,000 Kurds had been detained between September 1980 and September 1982 and two third of Turkish Army was deployed in Kurdistan in order to guarantee that its tranquillity was not distributed. “2,000 villages destroyed by the end of 1994, with over 750,000 rendered homeless.”(McDowell 1996: 426)
Nonetheless Ocalan and his PKK leadership had sensed the coming of 1980 coup and fled to the country before the military takeover. While many left-wing movements as well as the Kurdish groups found refuge in Europe or Soviet Union, the PKK leadership fled to neighbouring Syria where it could stay in contact with its cadres working inside Kurdistan. Notwithstanding 1,790 suspected of PKK members were captured, more than from any other Kurdish group. Several of those were the members of central committee who later in Turkey’s prison committed self-immolation in protest at the Turkish offensives. Others went on infinite hunger-strike in which they died after 72 days. This could be another huge and decisive factor in the emergence of the PKK as a dominant Kurdish group. No any Kurdish activist from other groups reached the level of determination to die in 72-days hunger strike.
The second phase of PKK’s evolution
The period of after 1984 marks the second phase of PKK’s evolution in which the organisation after eleven years of political works had tried all the possible means and came to the point that the only possible way to regain their lost identity is through the violent methods. By 1982 the PKK held its second congress and formulated a strategy of three broad phases: defence, balance and offence. In 15 August 1984 it carried out its initial guerrilla activity against the Turkish Military forces on a small scale but ended in a conventional battle; it seemed that it hoped to drive Turkish forces out of Kurdistan. That was a very defiant and shrewd move which attracted much of the attention of the Kurdish population, mainly the peasantries who had been dissatisfied with both landowners and the central government for years. That was a huge challenge for the government and it had a serious psychological effect in the area. Ismet Ismet the Turkish journalist explains the first guerrilla attack of the PKK as follow:
When in 1984 it raided two fortresses, the general image among the local people was one of petty-affection. They were referred to as “the kids,” or “the students.” In a region torn by its own feudal conflicts and a history of banditry, the concept of having armed youngsters fighting was not too surprising. (Ismet 1995: 26)
By 1984 the PKK also moved into Iraqi and Iranian territory. Syria was worried with the Turkish ongoing project (the GAP) to dam the Tigris and Euphrates River, which are located in the Northern Kurdistan (Turkish part of Kurdistan) and provides Syria with a bulk of its water. Supporting the Kurdish separatist’s movement in the Turkey would raise the possibilities of delaying the project. Not only Iran and Syria but Greece and Armenia had also been accused of supporting the PKK. Nonetheless, the Turkey’s neighbours had not provided so much support that Kurdish rebels could actually achieve their objectives. The side which received far much more foreign assistance was the Turkey. As David Romano (2006) puts it:
The United State alone has provided Turkey with infinitely more aid than any insurgent group could ever come close to attaining from foreign sources: until 1999, Turkey was the third largest recipient of US military aid, receiving $9 billion worth of arms and & 6.5 billion in grants and loans for military goods since 1980…. US-supplied attack helicopters, jets, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers have been used to destroy over 3,000 Kurdish villages. US- origin small arms have been used in the extra-judicial killing of suspected PKK soldiers or sympathizers. (Romano 2006: 53-54)
In 1985 PKK formed the Kurdistan Popular Liberation Front (ERNK) in order to organise the Kurdish masses inside Kurdistan and also to provide civil network. ERNK was considered as the political and civil branch of PKK and soon it demonstrated to be significantly successful despite all the state repression and deep-rooted impoverishment. It organised the masses in the huge scales and made the PKK as the real danger to the state. The ERNK’s effort considered a greater threat by Ankara than that of guerrilla fighting, for it might have resulted in the international community’s recognition of legitimate self-determination of the Kurds.
In the analysis of the violence used by the PKK it should not be overlooked that although the organisation was founded in 1973, its first military raid was carried out in 1984. The main reasons for that are; because after eleven years of civil and political works in the Turkish political system it seemed that all the possible methods were exhausted. The military coup in 1980 didn’t leave room for any political or diplomatic work. In 1983 Ankara officially banned the use of Kurdish langue in its attempt to stifle the Kurdish culture and the term ‘Kurdish’ was such a bogy that the laws found a form of order to make its prohibition explicit without mentioning the offended word. They began guerrilla style attacks on Turkish military forces deployed into Kurdistan to put into question the states capacity to deal with the group and maintain its rule. By the 1985 the PKK had gained the full attention of Turkish authorities after a battle in Siverek in which over 60 guerrillas and troops died.
The closed nature of Turkish political system was conducive to the emergence of such a form of dissent and in fact it encouraged the emergence of the radical Kurdish movements acting from outside of the state. PKK attracted many Kurdish people when it began to look like an alternative to the state. Ocalan’s famous dictum was that “Kurdistan is a colony, and we should liberate it”. For that reason during the 1980s it could be argued that the PKK ideally envisaged an independent Kurdistan including not only that of the Turkish part but all other parts of Kurdistan that according to Ocalan was “occupied” by the Iran, Iraq and the Syria. Notwithstanding, the PKK had not in practice claimed more than Northern Kurdistan ruled by Turkey.
The strategies and tactics of the PKK account for its growth. It was a movement which was built up from nothing. Seven students who came out of the Ankara University had a huge problem proving to the people that they were not “kids”. Revolutionary and guerrillas movement elsewhere in the world required at least from fifty to hundreds. As David Romano puts it: “Ocalan and his original six comrades were effectively creating some thing from nothing, their own original resources being intangibles, such as education, the ability to organise, charisma, determination, and ruthless readiness to use violence when necessary, and the willingness to take great risks”. (Romano 2006: 77) These all too well explain the emergence of the PKK as the dominant Kurdish group. Romano continues by putting that; “PKK was able to create a high degree of selfless devotion in its followers who often valued the organisation, its goals and the Kurdish identity more highly than their lives. Given the difficulty of guerrilla war that the PKK would launch against the state in 1984, such “human resources” would be crucial to the movement’s growth and success.” (Romano 2006: 138)
In the analysis of the PKK, Bulloch & Marris argue that; “The reasons for PKK success can be found in the make up of the organisation. Almost all recruits are young and from the poorest groups in society…. another fact is that, like Israeli army, the PKK has a tradition of leading from the front: the commanders and missionaries don’t stay back at base camps, but go in with their men to face the Turkish army. The result is that at least five central committee members have been killed.” (Bulloch & Morris, 1992: 180-181)
In this part I looked at the first and the second phase of the PKK’s evolution. In the following section I will be providing some analysis of the third phase of the movement.
Kardo Bokani