In the wake of the recent protests in Iran—marked by the brutal repression of demonstrators, widespread internet shutdowns, and a severe economic shock following the removal of subsidised exchange rates—it was widely expected, given Iran’s historical experience, that the unrest would evolve into a more political, social, and organised phase.
The removal of the preferential exchange rate has led to a dramatic increase in living costs and a loss of purchasing power, deepening structural poverty among the lower classes and large sections of the middle classes, especially among workers, teachers, retirees and other vulnerable groups. This structural poverty should have resulted in more radical protests and demands. Its underlying causes lie in failed privatisation policies, systemic corruption, and rent-seeking by semi-state institutions linked to the Revolutionary Guards and regime-affiliated foundations, compounded by the crippling economic sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe.
Since the emergence of the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement in 2022, a wide range of social movements have developed alongside a nationwide political uprising. This process has brought about profound transformations in Iran’s social fabric—from changes in women’s and young people’s appearance in public spaces and even within state institutions, to open acts of civil disobedience against imposed religious, political, and legal norms that severely constrain everyday life. Many participants have paid a heavy price, facing imprisonment, heavy fines, expulsion from work or education, and other severe repercussions.
The political and social movements emerging from the “Women, Life, Freedom” revolution are fundamentally radical, directly confronting entrenched ideological dogmas and traditional power structures. They represent one of the most significant behavioural revolutions in Iran since the Constitutional Revolution and the 1979 Revolution.
The twelve-day war between Iran and Israel, coupled with the current ‘neither war nor negotiation’ stance towards the United States, has created conditions that the regime is exploiting to reverse the gains made by the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ revolution. The authorities are seeking to prevent the recent protests, which began on 28 December and are widely seen as the second phase of this revolution, from becoming a new leap forward.
By promoting narratives of ‘foreign interference’ in peaceful protests, the regime carried out a massive crackdown on 8 and 9 January, arresting, injuring, and killing thousands of demonstrators. While no reliable official figures exist, reports indicate that a large number of unarmed civilians have been killed. The primary aim of these crackdowns has been to destroy the gains of the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ revolution.
Additionally, the regime has attempted to divert the protests from their popular, grassroots trajectory by amplifying the role of the former Shah’s son. Although he claims to lead the opposition, he lacks a genuine social base and remains disconnected from the demands of the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ revolution. His political ineffectiveness has, in practice, served the regime by providing justification for harsher repression. Monarchist movements have thus served as a convenient pretext for further crackdowns.
Currently, the government is exploiting the ‘neither war nor negotiation’ climate with Washington, occupying public attention with talks and diplomacy while secretly advancing a new phase of repression against protesters and the movement’s achievements. By deliberately prolonging negotiations — a strategy it has employed for years — the regime is seeking to buy time for domestic repression and minimise the likelihood of sustained mass protests.
The extensive repression of the past three years has prevented the emergence of collective and networked leadership within the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ revolution, blocked the formation of a shared minimum political programme and exacerbated ideological divisions within the opposition. At the same time, the failure to establish lasting links between street protests and organised labour and professional strikes has prevented scattered uprisings from evolving into a stable, nationwide movement.
Furthermore, it must be recognised that global powers approach Iran not out of solidarity with its people, but according to their own geopolitical interests. In many cases, they benefit from the continuation of an unstable yet manageable situation. This has left Iranian society in a state of psychological exhaustion, collective fear and anticipation — a condition that may temporarily reduce street mobilisation, but does not extinguish popular anger. Conversely, the persistence of economic, political and social crises will likely generate new, more radical and organised forms of resistance in the near future, returning the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ revolution to its central role.
Given the scale of human rights violations in Iran, including the mass arrest, torture and killing of protesters, the country should be at the centre of global public attention. The fact that this has not happened must be understood within the context of the current international order, in which human rights are not treated as universal principles, but as instruments that serve the geopolitical interests of major powers. The priority for dominant actors today is not to support a popular democratic movement, but to contain regional tensions, manage Iran’s nuclear programme and prevent uncontrolled instability. Highlighting large-scale repression would disrupt these calculations and is therefore deliberately overlooked.
Consequently, the invisibility of repression in Iran is not due to the absence of catastrophe, but rather to the confluence of global power interests, the regime’s deliberate strategies, and the structural repression and fragmentation of the opposition. While these factors have slowed the advance of the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ revolution, they have not stopped it.